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Quoted from The Business of War by David Parrott* "Elector Maximilian of Bavaria, whose main priority was preparing for the imminent Swedish assault on Bavaria, appointed Gottfried Heinrich von Pappenheim to command the remnants of Bavarian and Imperial forces spread in garrisons across the Westphalian Circles, with instructions to attempt a diversion which might take military pressure off the south… Neither Maximilian nor the Emperor would spare troops and money from what they anticipated would be the main struggle to decide the fate of southern Germany and the Habsburg lands. Nevertheless, by stripping troops from the Westphalian garrisons and drawing upon his reputation to encourage enterpriser-colonels to advance some capital to raise or reconstruct units, Pappenheim put together a modest force of some 4,000-5,000 troops, though these were, in his own words ‘experienced men, hardened and eager to fight’. Pappenheim’s operational instinct was to take the campaign deep into enemy-held territory, and in early January he broke out of Westphalia towards Magdeburg in the Lower Saxon Circle, where an Imperial garrison was blockaded by Swedish forces of 10,000 men commanded by the relatively inexperienced John Banér. Successfully misleading Banér about the strength of his own troops, Pappenheim drew him off and entered Magdeburg on 14 January 1632. Notoriously, of course, Magdeburg had been sacked and virtually destroyed by the Imperial army eight months previously; but it remained a prestigious and strategically important centre, and the military assumption was that such strongpoints should be held. Pappenheim simply incorporated the garrison into his army, destroyed the artillery which he could not take with him, and abandoned the city. Between February and October he conducted a remarkable, extended campaign across enemy-held territory in Lower Saxony and the borders of the Westphalian Circle, reliant on food and provisions that he could organize through his own resources, and obtain or seize locally. Plundering territory in a ruthless campaign of manoeuvre and surprise, he wrong-footed Swedish and Hessian forces which totaled almost four times his own 8,000 men, blocked a Swedish operation against the major Westphalian city of Paderborn, in tuin captured smaller places such as Höxter and Einbeck, while defeating Swedish and Hessian forces in detail. The campaign was a masterpiece of surprise, disinformation and rapid responses to evolving circumstances. While tying down throughout the summer of 1632 substantial Swedish forces which might otherwise have given Gustavus more flexibility in dealing with Wallenstein, Pappenheim was able to use interior lines to defend Westphalian territories against any Swedish counter-incursion. Moreover in the midst of a campaign that covered hundreds of miles of rapid troop movements and involved more than a dozen engagements with enemy forces, he managed to ensure adequate food supplies for his troops and even organized the purchase of new equipment and clothing from merchants in Cologne, having them shipped to Paderborn for distribution. As a matter of operational priorities, Pappenheim had avoided sieges of major places which might draw him into an unsought battle with larger Swedish forces. However, he rounded off the campaign with the remarkable capture of Hildensheim on 9 October, again by a combination of bluff, surprise and intimidation. Most immediately important for Pappenheim was the huge contribution of 200,000 talers imposed on the city, a vital means to provide his officers with the wherewithal to pay arrears of wages to their troops and reimburse themselves for the expenses in the campaign. A few days after this, Pappenheim responded to the ever-more insistent orders from Wallenstein that he move east to reinforces the main Imperial army, and was to meet his own death at Lützen a few weeks later." (King Gustavus Adolphus died, too, at Lützen. Wallenstein was assassinated in February, 1633.) *Parrott, David, The Business of War, publ Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp 139-140 |